[Updated 16 March 2009: Broken link. Strawson has a new home page here; but the link to his paper below is unfortunately gone. A revised version of the paper with commentary and Strawson's replies are collected in this book (actually a special edition of the Journal of Consciousness Studies.]
Hat tip goes to this post by Justin. Galen Strawson's new paper persuasively makes the straightforward argument:
1. Experience is a fundamental part of the world.
2. Emergence of experience from wholly non-experiential parts is incoherent.
3. From 1 and 2, panexperientialism is entailed.
Better yet, he does this an a very entertaining style -- sort of like your grouchy uncle who has run out of patience with impertinent nonsense (if said uncle was also an excellent philosopher).
Thursday, April 20, 2006
Tuesday, April 18, 2006
Notes from Tucson
I was fortunate to be able to attend a good portion of the Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006 conference in Tucson. This seventh biennial event, sponsored by the University of Arizona’s Center for Consciousness Studies, brings together all strands of inquiry into consciousness, including neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, physics and more. The conference had 500+ attendees and while I understand it used to be even larger, I can attest it was very robust and diverse. In addition to the main stage talks there was an unbelievably rich set of concurrent talks (most of which I missed) and poster presentations. It seems to me that the topic demands an interdisciplinary forum like this, and Tucson ably fills the role. I met and spoke to a number of interesting people there; everyone was extremely nice and there was a great vibe to the proceedings.
Below are notes on three of the talks I heard, those of Giulio Tononi, John Searle, and Paul Davies. I may look to add more later on.
Uriah Kriegel has 2 posts at Desert Landscapes about the conference (here and here). Unfortunately, I did not get a chance to meet Uriah, but happily did catch his main stage talk, where he effectively presented his self-representational theory of consciousness.
I. Giulio Tononi presented his information integration theory of consciousness. He was a very effective speaker and made a strong case for his work.
Here are a few of his preliminary remarks. Many have searched for “the” neural correlate of consciousness. Attempts to localize the phenomenon have not worked well. Today many think the correlate is in widely distributed thalamocortical activity. (But as an aside, attempts to identify a synchronicity mechanism for binding brain states is not promising and Tononi doesn’t seem to see a need for something like synchronization via 40 hz oscillation).
A couple of other thoughts: consciousness is more than introspective/reflective/higher-order self-consciousness. It is more and essentially simpler. It also goes beyond consciousness of the environment (dreams show us there is something of a world inside the skull).
Tononi offers these 2 paradoxes help us to think about consciousness (to which he returns at the end):
1. Why is the correlate in the cerebrum, not the cerebellum? The cerebellum has even more neurons, connections.
2. Why is it present in wakefulness rather than (non-REM) sleep?
Here’s a brief summary of Tononi’s approach (warning: these notes are taken on the fly and may do a poor job outlining the theory).
We have a large differentiated repertoire of possible states. Each state conveys a lot of information about itself as well as ruling out all other states. Also, each state is integrated (you cannot really subdivide it).
Tononi will use mathematics to characterize this phenomenology. Define “effective information” to be the entropy obtained by part of a system when you perturb another part. The minimum information partition you can put into the system (the ‘weakest’ link) will be used to define this. This can be measured, and is a measure of information integration.
It turns out that to maximize information integration, all elements in the system should participate by connecting to each other, but with non-uniform number and/or pattern of connections. Fewer connections is bad, but so is uniformity/simplicity of connections (specialization is good).
Analysis of the thalamocortical system shows that it has the right combination of specialization and integration to maximize effective information in the system. The cerebellum, in contrast, consists of separated modular systems which are not well integrated. Analysis of waking vs. sleeping states also shows how consciousness is correlated with this combination.
My summary thoughts: First, one implication I think is important is that consciousness is a graded phenomenon, not an all-or-nothing one. Second, it must be noted that a theory of this sort does not explain the interior/subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness (the hard problem). However, it impressed me and other listeners as presenting a good path for exploring how the particular richness as well as cognitive effectiveness of human consciousness is grounded in brain organization.
II. John Searle is an excellent speaker and I’m glad I got a chance to hear him talk. For those who take the “hard problem” seriously, however, Searle remains annoying. His talk was entitled "Dualism Revisited"
Searle defines consciousness as qualitative, subjective, unified and intrinsically intentional. He asserts consciousness is real and irreducible. Functional or behavioral approaches cannot explain consciousness (he has always been effective with his criticism of these).
He then says consciousness is caused in the brain by low-level neuronal processes, and is realized in the brain as a higher-level or system feature. Consciousness is a biological (specifically neurobiological) phenomenon.
He insists despite its irreducible first person ontology, consciousness just is a biological fact in the world. Once we have a good neurobiological theory, it will show how neuronal processes cause consciousness, and then we will be done.
He wants to say that the hard problem is just a conceptual confusion. We have different levels of description of the phenomena, but he denies this shows a need for any special further explanation. He uses (in my opinion) faulty analogies regarding different levels of description of say, an automobile engine (faulty because both levels are third-person, not first and third!). “Just stop worrying about it!” is the message.
Later in Searle’s talk, he speculated about why progress in explaining consciousness in neuroscientific terms so far seems to be slow. His answer was that the work focuses on localized phenomena and not enough on the large scale conscious “field”. These comments were in tune with some of Tononi’s mentioned above about the problem researchers have had when trying to localize the NCC.
III. Paul Davies on quantum biology and on a possible link between cosmology and strong emergence.
Paul Davies discussed his exploration of a number of speculative ideas which could advance our understanding of life and mind. First he discussed the view that quantum mechanics has something to contribute to this understanding.
He said that are 2 ways QM could play a role in life. First, a negative effect, with quantum indeterminacy limiting efficiency at the micro-level. Second, a positive effect, where life actually harnesses or exploits QM to improve efficiency or accomplish difficult tasks (with a comparison to the potential gains present in quantum computing).
Davies said there is plenty of circumstantial evidence for the role of QM in life. Certainly, we know many small biological structures do operate on the “quantum edge” in terms of their size. He gave a few examples of this.
He also discussed his suspicion that QM played a role on the origin of life (OOL). He very briefly outlined an idea of “quantum replicators” which could have been simpler precursors of living things.
He discussed the biggest challenge for quantum biology, which is decoherence. Simple models and experimental results indicate that quantum systems decohere very rapidly. But he says we may not know the whole story yet, and there may be environments where coherence can be sustained.
The next subject was on the subject of QM interpretations and whether there was an objective environmental trigger of wave function collapse (such as Roger Penrose’ idea that gravity plays a role). Davies discussed the idea that a specified level of complexity could engineer the collapse of the wave function and define the microscopic/macroscopic frontier. Quoting Seth Lloyd’s idea of the universe as a quantum computer, he said one could estimate the large but finite amount of classical information the universe can contain. He quoted an estimate of 10^120 bits. Quantum systems leveraging coherence can handle a huge amount of information, but perhaps the finite cosmological limit cuts off the size of these coherent quantum systems. A system of, say, 400 or so entangled particles could represent the approximate limit given this complexity ceiling imposed by the cosmos.
Finally, if there is indeterminacy due to a finite information capacity of the universe, then Davies said this could remove the obstacle to micro-level causal closure of the universe, and open the door to downward causation. “Physical systems are causally open when they reach a certain level of complexity – a level determined by the information processing capacity of the universe.” The origin of consciousness may lie within the quantum to classical transition at this critical threshold.
I like Davies a lot. At this point in his career he has been freed by his publishing success, Templeton prize, etc. to engage in diverse speculations rather than work within normal academic boundaries. But he is a very serious fellow. The main virtue being that even if these ideas have a very small chance of being correct, the fact that they would be very big deals if they did work out makes it worthwhile.
I got to talk with him in the lobby of the amphitheatre briefly and asked what he thought it would take to get more serious research time and money allocated to quantum biology. He said we needed a result that was both secure and non-trivial. He said we do have evidence of quantum level mechanisms in biology (citing enzymes and proton tunneling in DNA mutation), but these are relatively trivial, not interesting, effects. There are many leads to follow, though, and he is optimistic about some research which is underway.
Below are notes on three of the talks I heard, those of Giulio Tononi, John Searle, and Paul Davies. I may look to add more later on.
Uriah Kriegel has 2 posts at Desert Landscapes about the conference (here and here). Unfortunately, I did not get a chance to meet Uriah, but happily did catch his main stage talk, where he effectively presented his self-representational theory of consciousness.
I. Giulio Tononi presented his information integration theory of consciousness. He was a very effective speaker and made a strong case for his work.
Here are a few of his preliminary remarks. Many have searched for “the” neural correlate of consciousness. Attempts to localize the phenomenon have not worked well. Today many think the correlate is in widely distributed thalamocortical activity. (But as an aside, attempts to identify a synchronicity mechanism for binding brain states is not promising and Tononi doesn’t seem to see a need for something like synchronization via 40 hz oscillation).
A couple of other thoughts: consciousness is more than introspective/reflective/higher-order self-consciousness. It is more and essentially simpler. It also goes beyond consciousness of the environment (dreams show us there is something of a world inside the skull).
Tononi offers these 2 paradoxes help us to think about consciousness (to which he returns at the end):
1. Why is the correlate in the cerebrum, not the cerebellum? The cerebellum has even more neurons, connections.
2. Why is it present in wakefulness rather than (non-REM) sleep?
Here’s a brief summary of Tononi’s approach (warning: these notes are taken on the fly and may do a poor job outlining the theory).
We have a large differentiated repertoire of possible states. Each state conveys a lot of information about itself as well as ruling out all other states. Also, each state is integrated (you cannot really subdivide it).
Tononi will use mathematics to characterize this phenomenology. Define “effective information” to be the entropy obtained by part of a system when you perturb another part. The minimum information partition you can put into the system (the ‘weakest’ link) will be used to define this. This can be measured, and is a measure of information integration.
It turns out that to maximize information integration, all elements in the system should participate by connecting to each other, but with non-uniform number and/or pattern of connections. Fewer connections is bad, but so is uniformity/simplicity of connections (specialization is good).
Analysis of the thalamocortical system shows that it has the right combination of specialization and integration to maximize effective information in the system. The cerebellum, in contrast, consists of separated modular systems which are not well integrated. Analysis of waking vs. sleeping states also shows how consciousness is correlated with this combination.
My summary thoughts: First, one implication I think is important is that consciousness is a graded phenomenon, not an all-or-nothing one. Second, it must be noted that a theory of this sort does not explain the interior/subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness (the hard problem). However, it impressed me and other listeners as presenting a good path for exploring how the particular richness as well as cognitive effectiveness of human consciousness is grounded in brain organization.
II. John Searle is an excellent speaker and I’m glad I got a chance to hear him talk. For those who take the “hard problem” seriously, however, Searle remains annoying. His talk was entitled "Dualism Revisited"
Searle defines consciousness as qualitative, subjective, unified and intrinsically intentional. He asserts consciousness is real and irreducible. Functional or behavioral approaches cannot explain consciousness (he has always been effective with his criticism of these).
He then says consciousness is caused in the brain by low-level neuronal processes, and is realized in the brain as a higher-level or system feature. Consciousness is a biological (specifically neurobiological) phenomenon.
He insists despite its irreducible first person ontology, consciousness just is a biological fact in the world. Once we have a good neurobiological theory, it will show how neuronal processes cause consciousness, and then we will be done.
He wants to say that the hard problem is just a conceptual confusion. We have different levels of description of the phenomena, but he denies this shows a need for any special further explanation. He uses (in my opinion) faulty analogies regarding different levels of description of say, an automobile engine (faulty because both levels are third-person, not first and third!). “Just stop worrying about it!” is the message.
Later in Searle’s talk, he speculated about why progress in explaining consciousness in neuroscientific terms so far seems to be slow. His answer was that the work focuses on localized phenomena and not enough on the large scale conscious “field”. These comments were in tune with some of Tononi’s mentioned above about the problem researchers have had when trying to localize the NCC.
III. Paul Davies on quantum biology and on a possible link between cosmology and strong emergence.
Paul Davies discussed his exploration of a number of speculative ideas which could advance our understanding of life and mind. First he discussed the view that quantum mechanics has something to contribute to this understanding.
He said that are 2 ways QM could play a role in life. First, a negative effect, with quantum indeterminacy limiting efficiency at the micro-level. Second, a positive effect, where life actually harnesses or exploits QM to improve efficiency or accomplish difficult tasks (with a comparison to the potential gains present in quantum computing).
Davies said there is plenty of circumstantial evidence for the role of QM in life. Certainly, we know many small biological structures do operate on the “quantum edge” in terms of their size. He gave a few examples of this.
He also discussed his suspicion that QM played a role on the origin of life (OOL). He very briefly outlined an idea of “quantum replicators” which could have been simpler precursors of living things.
He discussed the biggest challenge for quantum biology, which is decoherence. Simple models and experimental results indicate that quantum systems decohere very rapidly. But he says we may not know the whole story yet, and there may be environments where coherence can be sustained.
The next subject was on the subject of QM interpretations and whether there was an objective environmental trigger of wave function collapse (such as Roger Penrose’ idea that gravity plays a role). Davies discussed the idea that a specified level of complexity could engineer the collapse of the wave function and define the microscopic/macroscopic frontier. Quoting Seth Lloyd’s idea of the universe as a quantum computer, he said one could estimate the large but finite amount of classical information the universe can contain. He quoted an estimate of 10^120 bits. Quantum systems leveraging coherence can handle a huge amount of information, but perhaps the finite cosmological limit cuts off the size of these coherent quantum systems. A system of, say, 400 or so entangled particles could represent the approximate limit given this complexity ceiling imposed by the cosmos.
Finally, if there is indeterminacy due to a finite information capacity of the universe, then Davies said this could remove the obstacle to micro-level causal closure of the universe, and open the door to downward causation. “Physical systems are causally open when they reach a certain level of complexity – a level determined by the information processing capacity of the universe.” The origin of consciousness may lie within the quantum to classical transition at this critical threshold.
I like Davies a lot. At this point in his career he has been freed by his publishing success, Templeton prize, etc. to engage in diverse speculations rather than work within normal academic boundaries. But he is a very serious fellow. The main virtue being that even if these ideas have a very small chance of being correct, the fact that they would be very big deals if they did work out makes it worthwhile.
I got to talk with him in the lobby of the amphitheatre briefly and asked what he thought it would take to get more serious research time and money allocated to quantum biology. He said we needed a result that was both secure and non-trivial. He said we do have evidence of quantum level mechanisms in biology (citing enzymes and proton tunneling in DNA mutation), but these are relatively trivial, not interesting, effects. There are many leads to follow, though, and he is optimistic about some research which is underway.
Thursday, March 30, 2006
Top-Down or Bottom-Up Quantum World?
At Antonio’s suggestion in his comments on the last post, I reviewed more of Ulrich Mohrhoff’s work on interpreting quantum physics contained in this paper and on his website, thisquantumworld. I also plowed through some of the debate between Mohrhoff (posting as koantum) and Patrick Van Esch (vanesch) on this thread at physicsforums. This was extremely fascinating although often over my head.
From my reading so far, Mohrhoff is saying two things which I think have some merit:
1. He rejects the assumption that the wave function represents something real. Many physicists extrapolate from the elegance of the idea of the deterministically evolving wave function to an ontological interpretation of QM (many-worlds or many minds) which tries to elevate this side of the story and minimize the measurement process. There is no quantum theory without measurements!
I’m sympathetic here, since while I believe the both of the quantum processes are fundamental, I think the measurement events are the “more real”: they constitute our concrete world while wave functions are the abstract possibility space available to be actualized by measurements (they are “real”, too, but not in a concrete sense).
2. While rejecting the naïve assumption that the wave function represents something real, Mohrhoff does want to find an objective description of reality which doesn’t appeal to consciousness. QM gives the probability distribution for unperformed measurements. It is a mistake to see these as subjective probabilities. They are objective probabilities.
I agree with this to an extent: I don’t see full-blown human consciousness as the sole avenue to measurement, and think natural systems implement measurements ubiquitously. However, in my view, the phenomenon of first-person consciousness is rooted in an experiential quality which is part of all measurement events (in the spirit of panexperientialist proposals such as Whitehead's or Gregg Rosenberg's).
But what is Mohrhoff’s positive proposal? What is “this quantum world”?
Here are some notes I took from his writing with my editorial comments in italics.
1. The world is intrinsically non-local. (Don’t be confused by thinking about the existence of a space-time background of points and instants – we contribute that to the theory, its not intrinsic).
2. Identical particles cannot be distinguished from each other independent of their possession of properties which can be distinguished.
So, these two statements imply that the quantum world cannot be built from the bottom up.
So how is it built? From the top-down.
“What ultimately exists is one. Call it whatever you like. Matter and space both come into being when this enters into (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations with itself…””…the relations are self-relations,”
This sounds like the world possesses a power of self-measurement. This is certainly an interesting rearrangement of the mystery, but I don’t see how it increases our understanding of reality.
Nothing has a property until it is measured (including the property of existing in a space-time continuum). Measurements create their outcomes (it isn’t that these properties are ontologically carried by the wave function between measurements). No measurements/no world.
OK (although I would say the wave function carries properties in their form as possibilities, and they are not created but made concrete when measured).
The macroscopic world is real in a way the microscopic world is not, since the probability of finding macro-objects where classically they should not be is very low. “… we must be allowed to look upon the positions of macroscopic objects – macroscopic positions, for short—as instrinsic, as self-indicating, or as real per se.” “The ‘foundation’ is the macroworld… not the micro-world.” “As philosophers would say, the properties of the quantum domain supervene on the goings-on in the classical domain.”
But the existence of macroscopic objects is just a primitive in this interpretation. This top-down view is equivalent to saying we just can't explain macroscopic events or objects. I find this unsatisfactory. I want to see us build an improved bottom-up explanation of the world, where the raw material is a property dualism matching the properties embedded in the quantum probability space with an “ability to measure” property possessed by natural systems.
From my reading so far, Mohrhoff is saying two things which I think have some merit:
1. He rejects the assumption that the wave function represents something real. Many physicists extrapolate from the elegance of the idea of the deterministically evolving wave function to an ontological interpretation of QM (many-worlds or many minds) which tries to elevate this side of the story and minimize the measurement process. There is no quantum theory without measurements!
I’m sympathetic here, since while I believe the both of the quantum processes are fundamental, I think the measurement events are the “more real”: they constitute our concrete world while wave functions are the abstract possibility space available to be actualized by measurements (they are “real”, too, but not in a concrete sense).
2. While rejecting the naïve assumption that the wave function represents something real, Mohrhoff does want to find an objective description of reality which doesn’t appeal to consciousness. QM gives the probability distribution for unperformed measurements. It is a mistake to see these as subjective probabilities. They are objective probabilities.
I agree with this to an extent: I don’t see full-blown human consciousness as the sole avenue to measurement, and think natural systems implement measurements ubiquitously. However, in my view, the phenomenon of first-person consciousness is rooted in an experiential quality which is part of all measurement events (in the spirit of panexperientialist proposals such as Whitehead's or Gregg Rosenberg's).
But what is Mohrhoff’s positive proposal? What is “this quantum world”?
Here are some notes I took from his writing with my editorial comments in italics.
1. The world is intrinsically non-local. (Don’t be confused by thinking about the existence of a space-time background of points and instants – we contribute that to the theory, its not intrinsic).
2. Identical particles cannot be distinguished from each other independent of their possession of properties which can be distinguished.
So, these two statements imply that the quantum world cannot be built from the bottom up.
So how is it built? From the top-down.
“What ultimately exists is one. Call it whatever you like. Matter and space both come into being when this enters into (more or less fuzzy) spatial relations with itself…””…the relations are self-relations,”
This sounds like the world possesses a power of self-measurement. This is certainly an interesting rearrangement of the mystery, but I don’t see how it increases our understanding of reality.
Nothing has a property until it is measured (including the property of existing in a space-time continuum). Measurements create their outcomes (it isn’t that these properties are ontologically carried by the wave function between measurements). No measurements/no world.
OK (although I would say the wave function carries properties in their form as possibilities, and they are not created but made concrete when measured).
The macroscopic world is real in a way the microscopic world is not, since the probability of finding macro-objects where classically they should not be is very low. “… we must be allowed to look upon the positions of macroscopic objects – macroscopic positions, for short—as instrinsic, as self-indicating, or as real per se.” “The ‘foundation’ is the macroworld… not the micro-world.” “As philosophers would say, the properties of the quantum domain supervene on the goings-on in the classical domain.”
But the existence of macroscopic objects is just a primitive in this interpretation. This top-down view is equivalent to saying we just can't explain macroscopic events or objects. I find this unsatisfactory. I want to see us build an improved bottom-up explanation of the world, where the raw material is a property dualism matching the properties embedded in the quantum probability space with an “ability to measure” property possessed by natural systems.
Friday, March 24, 2006
Futuristic Links
The Future of Philosophy
Brian Weatherson has an interesting post predicting that the trend toward specialization by academic philosophers will reverse in the future. As an onlooker who reads some philosophy, I’d say this would be a very good thing. My specific suggestion would be a plea for more metaphysics. Too often, it seems to me that metaphysical presuppositions go unexplained or unexamined in the specialized areas.
The Future of Fundamental Physics
As I’ve discussed in previous posts, fundamental physics seems stuck. Here’s Lee Smolin’s latest manifesto which stresses the need for more work on the philosophical foundations of theory. Also, here’s a slide show from John Baez which discusses “Where We Stand Today”. (Hat tip: Peter Woits’ blog).
Brian Weatherson has an interesting post predicting that the trend toward specialization by academic philosophers will reverse in the future. As an onlooker who reads some philosophy, I’d say this would be a very good thing. My specific suggestion would be a plea for more metaphysics. Too often, it seems to me that metaphysical presuppositions go unexplained or unexamined in the specialized areas.
The Future of Fundamental Physics
As I’ve discussed in previous posts, fundamental physics seems stuck. Here’s Lee Smolin’s latest manifesto which stresses the need for more work on the philosophical foundations of theory. Also, here’s a slide show from John Baez which discusses “Where We Stand Today”. (Hat tip: Peter Woits’ blog).
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Quantum Physics and Reality (Again)
I want to address this essay in Tuesday’s New York Times by science writer Dennis Overbye entitled, “Far Out Man. But Is It Quantum Physics?” (available with free registration). The essay correctly criticizes the misuse of physics by fuzzy-minded New Age people. But Overbye also errs in buying into an all-too-common misconception about the implications of Quantum Mechanics (QM).
Overbye begins with a discussion of the recent film “What the Bleep Do We Know!?” (which I have not seen). According to his account, the movie's premise is that QM implies the human mind essentially creates reality, so we should be able to alter and improve it as we like. Overbye traces the inspiration of this idea to Eugene Wigner’s suggestion (which followed on John von Neumann’s formulation of QM) that consciousness is the factor responsible for implementing measurements which collapse the superpositions of quantum states into a particular outcome. This idea has been enthusiastically picked up by the filmmakers and other New Ager’s, who inappropriately extrapolate it into the notion that the mind is somehow in control of reality. This opens the door to idealism, paranormal phenomena, and Deepak Chopra.
So far so good. But then we start running into problems when Overbye contrasts this improper use of physics with what he sees as the sober reality of the situation.
He starts by quoting Columbia’s David Albert as saying “It has been decades since anybody took Wigner’s idea seriously.” First, this is incorrect. There are people who have tried to build on the proposal; first and foremost I would cite Henry Stapp (see post here). Second, I believe the reason the mainstream hasn’t worked on the idea is because they lacked good research programs which had traction on the proposed intersection between consciousness and quantum systems; it is not because the idea has been shown to be wrong, which is the impression Overbye’s quick account leaves the reader. I’m personally skeptical that full-blown consciousness is the trigger for wave function collapse, but this remains an open question.
Next, Overbye misinterprets decoherence theory in this passage: “Many physicists today say the waves that symbolize quantum possibilities are so fragile they collapse with the slightest encounter with their environment. Conscious observers are not needed.” I’m sympathetic here since I made the same mistake for years. While I think we can legitimately infer from modern quantum theory and experimental results that natural systems ubiquitously implement measurements all around us, that is not what decoherence theory has shown. Decoherence describes how the interaction of a quantum system with the environment leads to a suppression of interference effects; rather than provide for an objective collapse, it still leaves a ‘mixture’ of states which prevails until we conduct a measurement (see this post for further discussion). The measurement problem remains. (Physicists also continue to explore explicit collapse models, but I think it's fair to say these remain problematic.)
Here’s Overbye’s bottom line:
“In other words, reality is out of our control. It’s all atoms and the void, as Democritus said so long ago. Indeed, some physicists say the most essential and independent characteristic of reality, whatever that is, is randomness. It’s a casino universe.”
This is a very common perspective, among scientists, philosophers and laypeople alike. They take the lesson of QM as being that the strictly deterministic clockwork metaphysics implied by classical physics should be simply overlaid with randomness. But regardless of the details, they assume that a worldview of materialism/physicalism which safely ignores the quantum measurement problem remains the correct stance.
I believe this is wrong. One cannot ignore that the reality implied by QM consists of both deterministically evolving quantum waves and the measurement events which give rise to the concrete phenomena of the macroscopic world. Measurement events remain unexplained within present-day physics. But I conclude the metaphysics necessary for a solution must be richer than physicalism. A property dualism where the ability to measure is an additional aspect of reality is needed (perhaps this could be incorporated into a version of neutral monism, too). And the proposal that this (likely ubiquitous) property and the emergent phenomena of life and consciousness are essentially linked is alive and well. It’s a shame the New Age antics seem to have raised a credibility hurdle for serious consideration of this view.
Overbye begins with a discussion of the recent film “What the Bleep Do We Know!?” (which I have not seen). According to his account, the movie's premise is that QM implies the human mind essentially creates reality, so we should be able to alter and improve it as we like. Overbye traces the inspiration of this idea to Eugene Wigner’s suggestion (which followed on John von Neumann’s formulation of QM) that consciousness is the factor responsible for implementing measurements which collapse the superpositions of quantum states into a particular outcome. This idea has been enthusiastically picked up by the filmmakers and other New Ager’s, who inappropriately extrapolate it into the notion that the mind is somehow in control of reality. This opens the door to idealism, paranormal phenomena, and Deepak Chopra.
So far so good. But then we start running into problems when Overbye contrasts this improper use of physics with what he sees as the sober reality of the situation.
He starts by quoting Columbia’s David Albert as saying “It has been decades since anybody took Wigner’s idea seriously.” First, this is incorrect. There are people who have tried to build on the proposal; first and foremost I would cite Henry Stapp (see post here). Second, I believe the reason the mainstream hasn’t worked on the idea is because they lacked good research programs which had traction on the proposed intersection between consciousness and quantum systems; it is not because the idea has been shown to be wrong, which is the impression Overbye’s quick account leaves the reader. I’m personally skeptical that full-blown consciousness is the trigger for wave function collapse, but this remains an open question.
Next, Overbye misinterprets decoherence theory in this passage: “Many physicists today say the waves that symbolize quantum possibilities are so fragile they collapse with the slightest encounter with their environment. Conscious observers are not needed.” I’m sympathetic here since I made the same mistake for years. While I think we can legitimately infer from modern quantum theory and experimental results that natural systems ubiquitously implement measurements all around us, that is not what decoherence theory has shown. Decoherence describes how the interaction of a quantum system with the environment leads to a suppression of interference effects; rather than provide for an objective collapse, it still leaves a ‘mixture’ of states which prevails until we conduct a measurement (see this post for further discussion). The measurement problem remains. (Physicists also continue to explore explicit collapse models, but I think it's fair to say these remain problematic.)
Here’s Overbye’s bottom line:
“In other words, reality is out of our control. It’s all atoms and the void, as Democritus said so long ago. Indeed, some physicists say the most essential and independent characteristic of reality, whatever that is, is randomness. It’s a casino universe.”
This is a very common perspective, among scientists, philosophers and laypeople alike. They take the lesson of QM as being that the strictly deterministic clockwork metaphysics implied by classical physics should be simply overlaid with randomness. But regardless of the details, they assume that a worldview of materialism/physicalism which safely ignores the quantum measurement problem remains the correct stance.
I believe this is wrong. One cannot ignore that the reality implied by QM consists of both deterministically evolving quantum waves and the measurement events which give rise to the concrete phenomena of the macroscopic world. Measurement events remain unexplained within present-day physics. But I conclude the metaphysics necessary for a solution must be richer than physicalism. A property dualism where the ability to measure is an additional aspect of reality is needed (perhaps this could be incorporated into a version of neutral monism, too). And the proposal that this (likely ubiquitous) property and the emergent phenomena of life and consciousness are essentially linked is alive and well. It’s a shame the New Age antics seem to have raised a credibility hurdle for serious consideration of this view.
Monday, March 13, 2006
Environmentalism Talks at Swarthmore
Here's a plug for an upcoming "Public Issues Forum" (2 lectures plus discussion) being sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium:
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTALISM
1:00 to 5:00 pm
Saturday, March 25
Science Center 199
Swarthmore College
Free and Open to the Public, followed by a reception with light refreshments
Speakers:
Mark Sagoff
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, U. of Maryland
Talk: "The Artist or the Watchmaker: Two Approaches to Environmentalism"
David Macauley
Dept. of Philosophy, Penn State
Talk: "Re-placing Environmental Philosophy: Walking as a Critical Practice"
Directions to Swarthmore below the fold
Driving Directions To Swarthmore College:
Swarthmore College is located 11 miles southwest of the city of Philadelphia in the borough of Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
Telephone:
The automated campus directions hotline: (610) 328-8001
The main campus number: (610) 328-8000
Address:
Swarthmore College
500 College Avenue
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Directions:
>From the North (New Jersey Turnpike or I-95)
Take the New Jersey Turnpike to Exit 3 and follow the signs to the Walt Whitman Bridge. Take I-95 South, pass Philadelphia International Airport and continue to exit 7, I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 North to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At bottom of exit ramp, follow sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the South
Follow I-95 North to Exit 7 (in Pennsylvania), I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the East (via the Pennsylvania Turnpike)
>From Exit 333, Norristown, follow signs for I-476 South. Stay on I-476 approximately 17 miles to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the signs to Swarthmore by turning left onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the West (via the Pennsylvania Turnpike)
>From Exit 326, Valley Forge, Take I-76 East, Schuykill Expressway, about 4 miles to I-476 South. Take I-476 approximately 12 miles to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the signs to Swarthmore by turning left onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the Airport
Take I-95 South. Continue to exit 7, I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 North to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At bottom of exit ramp, follow sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
". . . the rest of the way"
Stay in right lane and in less than 1/4 mile turn right onto Route 320 South (watch turns on Route 320). Proceed through second light at College Avenue to the first driveway on your right to visitor parking at the Benjamin West House. The Benjamin West House is the College's visitor center and has someone there to hand out maps and directions 24 hours a day.
". . .to the DuPont parking lot" (this is the lot adjacent to the Science Center)
Follow the directions under "the rest of the way" but instead of passing through the second light, turn right onto College Avenue. On College Avenue take your first right onto Cedar Lane. At the next stop sign turn left onto Elm Avenue. Before the next stop sign a driveway flanked by stone pillars will appear on your left. Turn there onto Whittier Place and follow it to DuPont parking lot on the right.
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTALISM
1:00 to 5:00 pm
Saturday, March 25
Science Center 199
Swarthmore College
Free and Open to the Public, followed by a reception with light refreshments
Speakers:
Mark Sagoff
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, U. of Maryland
Talk: "The Artist or the Watchmaker: Two Approaches to Environmentalism"
David Macauley
Dept. of Philosophy, Penn State
Talk: "Re-placing Environmental Philosophy: Walking as a Critical Practice"
Directions to Swarthmore below the fold
Driving Directions To Swarthmore College:
Swarthmore College is located 11 miles southwest of the city of Philadelphia in the borough of Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
Telephone:
The automated campus directions hotline: (610) 328-8001
The main campus number: (610) 328-8000
Address:
Swarthmore College
500 College Avenue
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Directions:
>From the North (New Jersey Turnpike or I-95)
Take the New Jersey Turnpike to Exit 3 and follow the signs to the Walt Whitman Bridge. Take I-95 South, pass Philadelphia International Airport and continue to exit 7, I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 North to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At bottom of exit ramp, follow sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the South
Follow I-95 North to Exit 7 (in Pennsylvania), I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the East (via the Pennsylvania Turnpike)
>From Exit 333, Norristown, follow signs for I-476 South. Stay on I-476 approximately 17 miles to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the signs to Swarthmore by turning left onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the West (via the Pennsylvania Turnpike)
>From Exit 326, Valley Forge, Take I-76 East, Schuykill Expressway, about 4 miles to I-476 South. Take I-476 approximately 12 miles to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At the bottom of the exit ramp, follow the signs to Swarthmore by turning left onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
From the Airport
Take I-95 South. Continue to exit 7, I-476 North/Plymouth Meeting. Take I-476 North to Exit 3, Media/Swarthmore. At bottom of exit ramp, follow sign for Swarthmore by turning right onto Baltimore Pike. (See below for ". . . the rest of the way.")
". . . the rest of the way"
Stay in right lane and in less than 1/4 mile turn right onto Route 320 South (watch turns on Route 320). Proceed through second light at College Avenue to the first driveway on your right to visitor parking at the Benjamin West House. The Benjamin West House is the College's visitor center and has someone there to hand out maps and directions 24 hours a day.
". . .to the DuPont parking lot" (this is the lot adjacent to the Science Center)
Follow the directions under "the rest of the way" but instead of passing through the second light, turn right onto College Avenue. On College Avenue take your first right onto Cedar Lane. At the next stop sign turn left onto Elm Avenue. Before the next stop sign a driveway flanked by stone pillars will appear on your left. Turn there onto Whittier Place and follow it to DuPont parking lot on the right.
Wednesday, March 01, 2006
Sean Kelly Blog
{UPDATE 24 March 2008: please note this blog I linked to below never really got going. Updated the link to Kelly's homepage at his new Harvard digs.}
Now I see that philosopher and phenomenologist Sean Kelly has a blog. It's focus is on Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception, of which Kelly is undertaking a new translation. I mentioned Kelly's work in admiring fashion in old posts here ,here, and finally here.
Now I see that philosopher and phenomenologist Sean Kelly has a blog. It's focus is on Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception, of which Kelly is undertaking a new translation. I mentioned Kelly's work in admiring fashion in old posts here ,here, and finally here.
Monday, February 27, 2006
Larry Arnhart Blog
Larry Arnhart has a blog here (hat tip: Timothy Sandefur posting on The Panda’s Thumb).
Several years ago I read Arnhart’s Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature. In the book, he draws together biological evidence and philosophical argument to paint a compelling picture of how human morals are derived from our biological nature. I found this to be a very valuable book.
I have ordered but not yet read his more recent book which shares a name with the blog, Darwinian Conservatism. The extension of his ideas into implications for political philosophy was a part of the earlier book, but not its emphasis (if memory serves). It looks like this area is the focus of the new book. My preconceived thought is that I’m less likely to agree as much with his conclusions in this area, but I’ll keep an open mind and report back here after I’m done reading.
Several years ago I read Arnhart’s Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature. In the book, he draws together biological evidence and philosophical argument to paint a compelling picture of how human morals are derived from our biological nature. I found this to be a very valuable book.
I have ordered but not yet read his more recent book which shares a name with the blog, Darwinian Conservatism. The extension of his ideas into implications for political philosophy was a part of the earlier book, but not its emphasis (if memory serves). It looks like this area is the focus of the new book. My preconceived thought is that I’m less likely to agree as much with his conclusions in this area, but I’ll keep an open mind and report back here after I’m done reading.
Thursday, February 16, 2006
The Gospel of Mary
The New Yorker had an interesting article last week on Mary Magdalene and her evolving status in Western culture and the church.
In the article, the author, Joan Acocella, says: “The crucial development in Magdalene scholarship was the discovery of the Nag Hammadi library.” This 1945 find in Egypt contained a wealth of previously unknown religious and philosophical writings from early Christianity. Acocella confuses things a bit though by implying that the Gospel of Mary (which she discusses next as the “key text”) was part of the Nag Hammadi cache. It was discovered separately (first acquired by a German scholar in Cairo in 1896, but not published until after WWII).
Anyway, in addition to mentioning Elaine Pagel’s The Gnostic Gospels (a great book) for its analysis of the Nag Hammadi texts, Acocella discusses several books on Mary Madgalene. A work she surprisingly omits is one I read a couple of years ago on the subject and can highly recommend: Karen L. King’s The Gospel of Mary of Magdala: Jesus and the First Woman Apostle.
The Gospel of Mary offers an intriguing insight into an early church community. King, a scholar at the Harvard Divinity School, compares its theology to other Gnostic works (she says it doesn’t necessarily fit well in the presumed template of Gnosticism), to the canonical New Testament, and to Hellenic thought. She sketches how this work sheds light on the historical development of Christianity prior to the settling of orthodoxy. King also discusses the implied prominent role of women in emerging Christianity. While Mary herself was not the author of the gospel bearing her name (it almost surely dates to the second century), and we can’t even be sure that a woman wrote it, it likely reflects theology developed at least in part by women.
Of all the wild and crazy stuff in Dan Brown’s novel The Da Vinci Code, I think you can take away one grain of truth: The crucial role of Mary in the canonical gospels (as the first discoverer of the truth of the resurrection) together with the implications from the Gospel of Mary point to an early Christian milieu where Mary in particular and women in general were more prominent than the later orthodoxy would have one believe.
In the article, the author, Joan Acocella, says: “The crucial development in Magdalene scholarship was the discovery of the Nag Hammadi library.” This 1945 find in Egypt contained a wealth of previously unknown religious and philosophical writings from early Christianity. Acocella confuses things a bit though by implying that the Gospel of Mary (which she discusses next as the “key text”) was part of the Nag Hammadi cache. It was discovered separately (first acquired by a German scholar in Cairo in 1896, but not published until after WWII).
Anyway, in addition to mentioning Elaine Pagel’s The Gnostic Gospels (a great book) for its analysis of the Nag Hammadi texts, Acocella discusses several books on Mary Madgalene. A work she surprisingly omits is one I read a couple of years ago on the subject and can highly recommend: Karen L. King’s The Gospel of Mary of Magdala: Jesus and the First Woman Apostle.
The Gospel of Mary offers an intriguing insight into an early church community. King, a scholar at the Harvard Divinity School, compares its theology to other Gnostic works (she says it doesn’t necessarily fit well in the presumed template of Gnosticism), to the canonical New Testament, and to Hellenic thought. She sketches how this work sheds light on the historical development of Christianity prior to the settling of orthodoxy. King also discusses the implied prominent role of women in emerging Christianity. While Mary herself was not the author of the gospel bearing her name (it almost surely dates to the second century), and we can’t even be sure that a woman wrote it, it likely reflects theology developed at least in part by women.
Of all the wild and crazy stuff in Dan Brown’s novel The Da Vinci Code, I think you can take away one grain of truth: The crucial role of Mary in the canonical gospels (as the first discoverer of the truth of the resurrection) together with the implications from the Gospel of Mary point to an early Christian milieu where Mary in particular and women in general were more prominent than the later orthodoxy would have one believe.
Friday, February 10, 2006
Disliking Qualia
I've said in the past that when discussing phenomenal conscious experience, I disliked talking about "qualia". The "hard problem" of consciousness is better appreciated by stressing the first-person nature of experience. The term qualia tends to evoke disembodied contents of experience, which the materialist has an easier time trying to explain.
Uriah Kriegel, writing yesterday on Desert Landscapes, spoke about his own dislike of qualia (in response to a comment on this post). I thought his explanation was helpful. [UPDATE: 3 March 2009. I removed the broken links to the defunct Desert Landscapes blog] Here's what he said:
Uriah Kriegel, writing yesterday on Desert Landscapes, spoke about his own dislike of qualia (in response to a comment on this post). I thought his explanation was helpful. [UPDATE: 3 March 2009. I removed the broken links to the defunct Desert Landscapes blog] Here's what he said:
The reasons I don’t like qualia talk are two.
Less important is the fact that some people use the term for properties that are definitionally non-representational and non-functional, while others use it as for properties that are definitionally those properties that make a mental state phenomenally conscious. On the latter definition, qualia may or may not be representational or functional. Much confusion ensues, when often someone might accuse someone else of qualia eliminativism and the charge remain ambiguous as between (i) the willingness to embrace representationalism or functionalism about consciousness and (ii) the willingness to claim that consciousness doesn’t exist.
More important is the fact that it connotes a conception of phenomenal character that I think is mistaken. On my view, the phenomenal character of my sky experience – the bluish way it is like for me to have the experience – has two component: qualitative character (bluishness) and subjective character (for-me-ness). The problem with qualia talk is that it connotes a conception of phenomenal character as nothing more than what I call qualitative character. My view, of course, is that this conception is flat wrong, and there’s more to phenomenal character than qualitative character. Now, I realize that this is controversial and many people would be happy to identify phenomenal and qualitative character, and leave what I call subjective character out of phenomenal character. But I think this should be treated as a substantive phenomenological claim, not something that just comes with the definition of phenomenal character. When people use the term qualia for phenomenal character, they effectively write off subjective character without argument. (They don’t necessarily have to, but that’s just what the term “qualia” connotes, simply in virtue of its phonological affinity to “qualitative.”)
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